With Mubarak gone, it remained to be seen whether the state media would face a similar revolution from within. There were ardent efforts from within some of these institutions, such as the young editors and reporters movement at Al-Ahram, which organized from the early days of the revolution and continued for weeks after the removal of Mubarak, trying to topple the paper’s NDP-loyal administration. Similar efforts at transforming Egypt’s broadcast sector—referred to as Maspero—pitted pro-revolutionary employees against an old guard that was extremely difficult to budge.
In February and March, it was clear that there was a marked shift in the tone of state broadcasting; they had seemingly embraced the protest movement, treated its youth as inspirational figures, and dedicated substantial amounts of coverage to memorializing the revolution. For those watching the news after 11 February, it looked like a sea-change whereby government television immediately took on the revolutionary tone, playing patriotic songs commemorating the 25 January youth revolution. Protesters became a mainstay on the state television talk shows. It appeared that the revolution had finally arrived to the region’s largest broadcast entity. Young journalists demanded the removal of top management whose work during the past few years had ensured that state media was firmly committed to the Mubarak government and the NDP...
Suffice it to say that the gulf between state and private media has never been wider than it was between April and December 2011. The state media’s superior terrestrial reach in Egyptian homes and its advantage over private satellite networks has given the military the assurance that the majority of Egyptians will watch their shows. Additionally, SCAF has also gambled on the Egyptian people’s loyalty and respect for the armed forces through decades of indoctrination in the media and education.
Journalistic integrity and the public good became debatable terms as the state media continued to excuse, overlook, or absolve the police state’s attack on the unrelenting protest movement. At no moment was this more stark than on 9 October 2011, when the military attacked a peaceful protest by a largely Coptic Christian group, which led to the deaths of dozens, many of whom were run over by armored vehicles. Despite the incident occurring at the front door of Maspero (the building housing the Egyptian Radio and Television sector), the state media not only accused the protesters of attacking the military, but also called on people to protect their military against attacks by the Copts. This was done against the backdrop of a wide range of evidence suggesting that the opposite accounts were true...
Egyptians now find themselves glued to the satellite television networks every night as they follow the analysis and fallout of each day’s activities and developments. Channel switching between the talk shows is very common as hosts compete to book the most compelling and informed, and in some cases the most eccentric voices. This feeling of near-complete liberty is a new one and Egyptians, guests, and audiences alike are reveling in it. With satellite penetration rates rising swiftly to almost sixty percent of households, these networks are now beginning to split the pie with terrestrial state television channels that remain the most accessible with up to ninety-five percent of households having access to hem.
With the state media stubbornly crawling along in the most-Mubarak era, the private satellite channels have emerged as the most significant players in the media scene with the talk-show format reigning supreme as most common source of news for Egyptians with access to satellite television. This format is peculiar because of its open-ended approach. It tends to be extremely lengthy and host-based programs can easily run over two hours with infrequent commercial breaks. The primary players in this highly competitive talk-show market are some of the older networks, and a few newcomers. Egypt’s richest man, Naguib Sawiris, is the owner of the channel ONTV which runs two extremely popular talkshows, Yousri Fouda’s Akher Kalam (Last Words) and Reem Magued’s Baladna Bilmasry (Our Country in Egyptian). Its competitors are Egypt’s first private satellite network Dream TV which runs Mona El-Shazly’s popular talk show Al-Ashera Masa’an (10:00 pm). Mehwar TV, owned by Egyptian businessman Hassan Rateb, is home to Moataz El-Demerdash’s show 90 Dakeeka (90 minutes). Al-Hayat boasts a large audience among the private satellite channels but rarely has any particular formula that caters to any particular audience segment. One of its hosts Sherif Amer was formerly with Al-Hurra. New channels such as CBC, owned by wealthy engineer Mohammed Amin said to be behind Youm7 newspaper, includes a family of networks is a hefty startup with a large budget to attract a large number of audiences.
Notable among the newcomers is Al-Tahrir channel which is the collaborative effort of Ahmed Abu Haiba, the media entrepreneur behind moderate Islamic television preacher Amr Khaled and of Islamic music channel 4Shabab, Ibrahim Eissa, the prominent oppositional journalist who was imprisoned under Mubarak, and interior design engineer Mohammed Morad. Formed largely out of Tahrir Square during the eighteen days of protest, the star-studded roster of the channel has given them an advantage over their competitors in the first few months of the SCAF-rule. It currently boasts talk shows hosted by veteran Mahmoud Saad, formerly of Egyptian state television, Ibrahim Eissa, a show by one of Egypt’s most respected oppositional journalists Hamdy Kandil, scriptwriter and editorialist for Almasry Alyoum Bilal Fadl, and until recently prominent activist Nawara Negm. For some months, Al-Tahrir was the only channel which consistently criticized SCAF, raising questions about possible backroom deals with powerbrokers. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that Al-Tahrir and some of the other post-Mubarak startup networks are more inclined to level criticism to the military council compared to their more established competitors.
However, one should not confuse this growing margin of freedom with total media liberty. Since Mubarak’s toppling, it has been a tug-of-war between the interim authorities and private broadcasters in an attempt to rein the latter in and curb their capacity to challenge the state’s rhetorical monopoly. Hence the military has had to play the game wisely to avoid being admonished publicly for muzzling the press. By calling in to producers of shows to inquire about the day’s line up, interfering in the way stories are told, and calling during broadcast and demanding to be put on air, they are able to send a clear message to the private stations—that they are being monitored closely. Through a sinister combination of compulsion and coercion, the military has both effectively infiltrated most private networks and has an array of options to ensure compliance from station owners, staff and media personalities. Numerous examples of this are documented in the timeline below...
Another important phenomenon in private media in Egypt has been the development of online video portals and gateways for every newspaper as they look to exploit the increasingly relevant multimedia documentation of developments in the country and to capitalize on the growing online audience. Furthermore, they are also filling an important void for satellite networks that are incapable of financially supporting a large network of reporters to follow the daily incidents happening throughout the country. The most prominent portals are those of Al-Ahram, Al-Wafd, Almasry Alyoum, El-Shorouk and Youm7 whose online teams have excelled at posting content in an extremely timely fashion. These repositories of sourced video content have provided material and fodder for the private networks that are less reluctant than the state media to broadcast amateur footage and rough cuts of video on air.
Private networks have become closely aligned with political movements, often using their air-time to advocate for their perspectives, e.g. ONTV’s coverage of El-Kotla El-Masreya (The Egyptian Bloc). One cannot underplay the significant role played by channel owners and media entrepreneurs in the content and conduct of the channels. From the firing of Dina Abdelrahman from Dream TV by owner Ahmed Bahgat after an on-air argument with a military general to the frequent interventions by Naguib Sawiris both behind the scenes and on the set of prominent talk-show on his channel ONTV...
Yet a more sinister problem has come in the form of an overwhelming disinterest in and condescension towards the massive labor actions affecting the country. The patterned dismissal of these protests and strikes and sit-ins which can be best described as an attempt to uproot institutional corruption and corporate greed in every industrial and service sector in the country and ensure labor and farmer rights, is a self-evident disparagement of any anti-corporate agenda in the country. Most of the station owners who earned their fortunes in other industries—from mobile technology and tourism, and from ceramics to construction—are personally opposed to these labor movements and have derailed any sustained coverage of these actions on their respective channels. So while they may have differing agendas vis-à-vis SCAF, the Islamist political forces, the youth coalitions, and the liberal politicians, most converge on their inflexibility on labor rights...
At the end of the day, one cannot describe any private network as purely and truly revolutionary. As of the time of publication, few networks are able to openly discuss issues such as the military budget, the armed forces’ political immunity, and its deep tentacles in the country’s economy. Few stations have attempted to scrutinize Saudi political and economic interests in Egypt. And despite the constant references to enmity with Israel, virtually no station can “advocate” the scrapping of the Camp David Accords or cutting gas supplies to Israel. These have become subjects of the highest national security perhaps even more so than incitement against the military domestically.
